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U.C.C. D.O.A.: LE ROI EST MORT, VIVE LE ROI
Egon Guttman*
Modem development of commercial law in the United States com-
menced with the creation of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). One of the first acts of the
NCCUSL was to direct its Committee on Commercial Law to prepare a
draft statute for negotiable instruments based largely on the British Im-
perial Bills of Exchange Act.' The use of British legislation acknowl-
edged the United Kingdom as the predominant economic power in the
world due to its banking and commercial interests, which effectively gov-
erned mercantile relationships in every hemisphere. The shift of eco-
nomic power from Europe to the United States and the development of
technology and changes in business approaches by U.S. entrepreneurs
and banking entities resulted in the need to reevaluate the rules gov-
erning commercial transactions to reflect the approach and practices of
U.S. business. Consequently, the Uniform Commercial Code was pro-
posed as a governing law for enactment in the various jurisdictions of the
United States.
Karl Llewellyn and Soia Mentschikoff, the main reporters of the
proposed UCC draft, looked to the European concept of a mercantile
code, an equivalent to the German Commercial Code, Handel-
sgesetzbuch,3 rather than to a common-law approach to such legislation.
Their approach to drafting the UCC was to represent the needs of mer-
cantile interests and to leave consumer protection to legislative and judi-
cial development.4 As a result, in interpreting statutory language a
problem is created once such an underlying policy determination is
made. Whereas common-law courts traditionally adapt generalized laws
1. The king is dead, [long] live the king.
* Levitt Memorial Trust Scholar and Professor of Law, The American University,
Washington College of Law.
2. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. ch. 61 (Eng.). The draft prepared by Mr.
John J. Crawford was subsequently accepted by the NCCUSL and was enacted throughout the
United States. See FREDERICK K. BEUITEL, BELrEL's BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW 1353-54 (7th ed. 1948). The first state to enact the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (NIL) was Connecticut in 1897. Id. at 1353. The last jurisdiction to do so was the
Canal Zone in 1933. Id.
3. HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] (F.R.G.).
4. See, eg., U.C.C. § 9-206 (1990) (stating that absent a statute or court decision to con-
trary, agreement that buyer or lessee of consumer goods cannot assert claim or defense against
seller's or lessor's assignee is enforceable).
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to specific circumstances and thereby create a judicial base for stare deci-
sis to operate, civil-law courts return to the words of the statute to deter-
mine whether the situation the court is adjudicating falls within its
purview. In her writings,' Mentschikoff suggests this civil-law approach
to law students seeking to determine how to apply the UCC to situations
they are called upon to resolve.
This approach creates a policy determination that severely hampers
the expansion of general principles of commercial law to situations in-
volving nonmerchant parties. This leaves lacunae in the law, which have
not been filled because of an absence of specific rules. A typical example
is reflected in the case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.6 As
this case wound its way through the municipal court system of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, judges claimed that they were unable to protect the
consumer due to an absence of a consumer sales protection statute, such
as the statutes in existence in Maryland and Virginia.7 Not until the
federal court of appeals, then the highest appellate court in the District of
Columbia, heard the case, was a common-law concept of unconscionabil-
ity applied to protect the consumer from a balloon payment as well as
from the invidious approach that had allowed apportionment of all pay-
ments to outstanding debts.8
What is said here is not intended to convey the impression that a
civil-law court would not respect the pronouncements of a superior court
or of another court of parallel jurisdiction. Although a puisne judge in
the civil-law system has the power to interpret a clause in the civil code
contrary to the interpretation adopted by a superior court, it is not likely
that a judge would incense judges of a superior court by refusing to fol-
low their interpretation. Not only would such a judge face a reversal by
a superior court, but the resulting additional burdens on the superior
court might interfere with the lower court judge's expectation of being
elevated to a higher court in a system that provides for the judiciary as a
career with inherent promotional expectations.
An absence of consumer-oriented rules in the UCC has led courts to
draw analogies from other legal rules in order to apply acceptable con-
cepts to consumer situations. It also has forced the development of some
consumer-oriented legislation. But the concomitant to the Llewellyn-
5. See SOIA MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 7-12 (1970).
6. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (remanding case to correct lower court's mistaken as-
sumption that unconscionability is not sufficient ground for court to refuse to void installment
sales contract).
7. Id. at 448 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C.
1964)).
8. See id. at 449.
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Mentschikoff approach would have been a body of statutory law
equivalent to a civil-law code on "obligations."
The problem that now exists in the United States is that there is no
comprehensive body of consumer legislation developing. The progress
made during the 1960s seems to have come to a halt. Only twelve U.S.
jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.9 As a
result, the consumer movement turned to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and Congress for help. The FTC responded, for example, by
promulgating various rules to prevent the abusive use of negotiable in-
struments. By prohibiting a credit seller-or a lender for the purpose of
consumer sales-from taking a negotiable instrument, the FTC ensured
that consumers would no longer be confronted by a holder in due
course10 demanding payment when the underlying obligation was not
performed or otherwise would be subject to a valid defense to payment. 1
Further, to obviate pressure tactics in home solicitation sales, the FTC
created a seventy-two hour cooling-off period allowing a consumer buyer
to recant his or her contractual undertaking.12 These rules were promul-
gated under the authority of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
authorizes the FTC to promulgate rules to prevent unfair trade
practices. 13
This approach to resolving consumer issues is not only slow, but
also haphazard. It became clear that legislation was needed. Turning to
Congress, consumer advocates achieved the enactment of a series of con-
sumer laws. Foremost in such legislation is the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act,14 which sets a minimum market morality below which state
laws governing consumer transactions must not fall. This federal legisla-
tion allows states to set their own higher standards and thus permits
9. The 1968 Act was enacted in Colorado, Guam, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See 7 U.L.A. 208 (Supp. 1992). The 1974 Act was enacted in
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas and Maine. 7A id. 1 (Supp. 1992). Various states have enacted their own
versions of consumer protection laws. Thomas D. Crandall, It Is Time for A Comprehensive
Federal Consumer Credit Code, 58 N.C. L. REv. 1, 19-20, 19 n. 114 (1979).
10. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (defining "holder in due course").
11. See FTC Rule 433, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (1992) (prohibiting taking a negotiable in-
strument in connection with consumer credit sales transaction so as to prevent abuses that
could result from negotiation of such instrument to holder in due course and requiring that an
instrument be legended to indicate that the issuer may have defenses against the seller or
lender that can also be asserted against the holder of the instrument); see also U.C.C. § 3-
106(d) (stating that there cannot be a holder in due course where an instrument is legended in
accordance with statutory or administrative law indicating that the holder or transferor is
subject to defenses the issuer could assert against the original payee).
12. Cooling-off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1992).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 52 (1988).
14. Id §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
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them to enact more protective legislation.15 Unfortunately, congres-
sional preoccupation with what it considers more momentous matters
has slowed and practically stopped the development of consumer protec-
tion legislation.
Meanwhile, commercial and technological developments have
shown the UCC to be unresponsive not only to the needs of the con-
sumer/customer, but also to the expectations of the mercantile commu-
nity.1 6 The UCC was enacted in what can now be described as a "horse
and buggy age" 7 of paper driven activities. Business has become com-
puterized, and, as a result, electronic data input (EDI) has made many
provisions of the UCC archaic and out of touch with the realities of the
marketplace. As a result, many UCC provisions are either ignored or
only act as a means of slowing mercantile expectations. In many in-
stances, these provisions are used to avoid obligations that turn out to be
financially unrewarding, but that otherwise would have been completed.
Foremost in this are the various statutes of fraud provisions in the
UCC.18
The origin of the statute of frauds lies in the former inability of liti-
gants to testify for fear of inadvertently committing perjury, which would
condemn their soul to ever-lasting purgatory. The statute of frauds re-
garding the sale of goods 9 has been repealed in England,2 ° whence this
statute found its way into the laws of the United States.2 In addition,
the commercial laws of most developed countries do not have an
equivalent provision. Thus, even though there is a need for an audit trail,
it is difficult to justify this formalistic anachronism. The approach of the
UCC in linking the demands of the statute of frauds to a written memo-
randum in order to make a contract enforceable, and then defining a
writing in a way to make it dependent on an "intentional reduction to
tangible form,"22 is ridiculous. Illustrating this is the case of Ellis Can-
15. Id. § 2311(c)(2).
16. I, therefore, use the term "consumer/customer" to refer not only to a purchaser of an
item relevant to a personal or household purpose, U.C.C. § 9-109(1), but also to a purchaser of
a "consumer product." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(1), 2312 (1988); 16 C.F.R. § 701.1(b) (1992).
17. See Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society (pt. 2), 37 COLUM. L.
Rav. 341, 395 n.137 (1937) ("Sales law, like the broader fields of Contract and Property, of
whose nature it partakes, has need to take as one motto of revision: 'The old grey mare, she
ain't what she used to be.' ").
18. See U.C.C. §§ 1-206, 2-201, 2A-201, 8-319, 9-402.
19. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.) (repealed
1954).
20. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34 (Eng.).
21. See Egon Guttman, Investment Securities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11
Burs. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1962).
22. U.C.C. § 1-201(46).
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ning Co. v. Bernstein,23 in which the court allowed the admission of a
tape recording, but then required that the cassette be signed by the party
to be charged under the contract.24 What effect does this have on an
EDI communication? Would the possibility of reduction to a hard copy
print-out satisfy the requirement for a memorandum in writing?25 How
do you append a signature to such a print-out when the parties commu-
nicate through EDI?
To understand changes in the courts' approach to issues affecting
the commercial activities of producers, merchants and banks, requires an
evaluation of the existing provisions of the UCC. In such an evaluation,
technological developments as well as the practice of merchants illustrate
that some of the archaic requirements of existing laws no longer serve the
purpose for which they were originally embodied in the UCC. Unfortu-
nately, the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC26 is reactive and un-
able to keep up with the changing mercantile scene.
The need for revision has been recognized, however, and the ABA
together with the American Law Institute (ALI) created a number of ad
hoc committees and task forces to review existing provisions in the UCC
and, if necessary, to propose amendments. Once these committees com-
plete their work, the NCCUSL delegates to a drafting committee the task
of drafting revisions. Some of the former members of the ABA and ALI
committees continue as advisors to the NCCUSL. On completion of this
drafting effort, the draft is presented to both the ALI and NCCUSL and
then recommended for enactment by the various state legislatures.
A number of UCC articles have now been reviewed. These reviews
and evaluations have resulted in revisions of UCC Articles 3, 4, 6, 8 and
9, as well as proposals for the enactment of two new UCC Articles: 2A
(Leases) and 4A (Funds Transfers). Newly enacted Article 2A recog-
23. 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972).
24. Id. at 1228. The contract involved an investment securities transaction and was gov-
erned by U.C.C. § 8-319 (1977). Ellis Canning Co., 348 F.Supp. at 1227-29. But see Roos v.
Aloi, 487 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642-43 (1985) (holding that tape recording of oral agreement is not
"writing" under statute of frauds under New York General Obligations Law § 5-701 (McKin-
ney 1978) (codified without amendment at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney
1989))).
25. Revisions of UCC Article 1 are at present under consideration by an ABA task force
studying this problem.
26. The American Law Institute established the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC to
evaluate proposed revisions and non-uniform amendments to the UCC. Agreement Between
the American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws Establishing Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Aug. 5,
1961, in NCCUSL, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 168 (1961).
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nizes that economic and tax advantages can be gained by leasing rather
than purchasing durable goods. The acceptance of such practices re-
quired that the law come to grips with leasing issues. Prior to the enact-
ment of Article 2A, leasing issues were solved by analogy to Article 2
(Sales).27 Although many provisions applicable to sales were relevant to
leasing issues, solving by analogy was a tenuous method at best.
The driving forces behind the movement to amend the UCC are
technology and efficiency; both are valuable assets for sophisticated par-
ticipants in market transactions-such as banks, clearing houses, brokers
and clearing corporations and so on. As a result, amendments are driven
by the needs of industry. They reflect the needs of "merchants,"28 rather
than those of the customer/consumer. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in connection with the proposed revisions of Article 8 (Investment
Securities).
Since the New York State Law Revision Commission thoroughly
analyzed the UCC, including Article 8,29 fundamental changes have oc-
curred in the securities industry. The 1977 amendments created a paral-
lel approach to securities issued in uncertificated form by their issuers.
These amendments were based on the sleepy activities of the 1950s secur-
ities markets; today, however, we must deal with the veritable deluge of
trades that occur daily in the market. In 1962, it was considered a busy
day on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) if ten million shares were
traded. Today, 200 million shares traded in a single day does not cause a
ripple and is scarcely newsworthy. The "paper crunch" of 1968-1969,
that developed as a result of trading in excess of ten million shares in one
day, was alleviated by immobilizing the stock certificate in depositories
and by allowing settlement of trades by means of book entries. These
entries can be triggered by electronic communication to a depository,
such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), instigated, for example,
by the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC). The NSCC
acts as a clearing agent for trades on the NYSE and interposes itself into
trades between members of the NYSE that trade on the exchange. The
1977 revisions of Article 8 created a parallel rule for transfers of securi-
ties in uncertificated form to those applicable to certificated securities,
but has not been very successful. It is unable to cope with the problems
produced by the large trading volume on a securities market.
27. For example, with regard to warranties, compare U.C.C. § 2-313 with § 2A-213, § 2-
312 with § 2A-21 1, § 2-314 with § 2A-212, § 2-315 with § 2A-213, and § 2-317 with § 2A-215.
28. See id. § 2-104(1) (defining merchant as term of art).
29. See LAW REVISION COMM'N OF N.Y., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE FOR 1955, at
1873-2004 (1955).
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Since the adoption of the UCC by all U.S. legal systems, albeit with
some amendments reflecting specific influences, the world of commerce
has expanded and become global in nature. The United States is now
firmly established as the focal point in trade. As a result, international
trades no longer refer to English law, nor is it usual for such trades to
incorporate a reference to the civil-law countries to deal with new devel-
opments. International commerce pays attention to the commercial law
practices in the United States when resolving issues of commerce. Many
contracts entered into by United States merchants with foreign concerns
contain clauses referring to the UCC as the governing law. Such refer-
ence is either a general reference, or it refers to the UCC as applied in the
state from which the United States merchant operates.
In addition, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) is attempting to set basic international standards for
international commerce.3 0 In discussions concerning standards for mod-
em global trading activities, negotiators and drafters pay great attention
to approaches adopted in the United States. For example, UNCITRAL
activities have led to the promulgation of the United Nations Convention
on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory
Notes,3 1 as well as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 32 which became self-executing upon ratifica-
tion.33 UNCITRAL is considering other conventions and model laws,
such as a proposal for a model law governing guaranty letters.34 Many of
these developments will affect the legal rules to be stated in revised provi-
sions of the UCC, because the United States must now consider itself
part of a global economy and U.S. trade is no longer purely a domestic
affair.
35
30. See Kenneth T. Ungar, Note, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under
UNCITRAL's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 717, 718-21 (1987).
31. G.A. Res. 165, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/43/165 (1988), re-
printed in 28 I.L.M. 176 (1989). This convention does not apply to checks and has not yet
been ratified by the United States.
32. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264
(1987).
33. Id. art. 99(1), (6), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. at 6279.
34. See Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the Work of Its
Seventeenth Session, U.N. GAOR 9th Comm., 25th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361
(1992).
35. See Egon Guttman, Bank Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit: Moving Toward
A Uniform Approach, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 167 (1990); see also UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRAC-
TICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (Int'l Chamber of Commerce Proposed Final Text 1993)
(ICC Publication No. 500). These rules and practices are expressly incorporated into versions
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Although in revising the commercial laws of any country drafters
must consider the wider question of private international law, in the
United States when considering uniform state laws we must also consider
the question of federal law. In many instances, federal law challenges
state law to update itself; or it may intervene to preempt the area. This
occurred in connection with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.36 An-
other example is the Market Reform Act of 1990."7 Section 5 of that Act
provides that after investigation and consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury and with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the power,
"[n]ot withstanding any provision of State law,... [to] adopt rules con-
cerning... the transfer of certificated or uncertificated securities.., or
limited interests (including security interests) therein" if it finds that such
rules are necessary to protect investors or the public interest, and an ab-
sence of such rules inhibits "the safe and efficient operation of the na-
tional system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions."38
Should such rules "impair or diminish, directly or indirectly," the rights
of parties to such transactions under state law the SEC may exercise
these powers only if it determines that "the benefits of such rule[s] out-
weigh such impairment or diminution of rights. ' 39 This exhortation re-
flects the policy of the Congress to create an efficient national market
system in securities, even at the cost of preempting state law. 
40
In this drive towards efficiency, the individual seems to lose out. It
is often forgotten that without the customer/consumer there is no trade,
that without the investor there is no need for a securities market. Also
overlooked is that the infusion of capital into the market requires not
only that the rights of the lender be protected, but also that the individ-
ual investor/customer be protected as well.
In securities transactions, state laws too often reject this obligation
and attempt to relinquish it to federal laws. For example, the Federal
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),41 created by the Se-
of the UCC in New York, N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1991); Illinois, see
Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Alabama, ALA.
CODE § 7-5-102(4) (1975); Arizona, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-5102(D) (1988); and Mis-
souri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78q-1 (Supp. III 1991).
38. Id. § 78q-l(f), (f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(A)(ii).
39. Id. § 78q-1(f)(2)(A)(iii).
40. See Egon Guttman, Investment Securities Law: New Federal and State Developments
and Their Effect on Article 8, 24 UCC L.J. 307 (1992).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78cce (1988).
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curities Investor Protection Act (SIPA),42 is designed to protect the cus-
tomer of a brokerage house in the event of a failure of the broker.4 3 To
do so the SIPC levies a charge on brokerage houses based on their trad-
ing volume" and may obtain a loan from the SEC which will obtain the
funds from the U.S. Treasury.45 This approach led to the argument that
in a liquidation, a lender to a securities industry professional should be
allowed to claim a priority to any claims of customers. Admittedly,
traditional approaches to secured lending would allow this. The lender
in possession will always have priority over creditors who fail to protect
themselves by perfecting a security interest in a negotiable instrument.46
The situation becomes more complicated when we deal with an incorpo-
real or intangible right created in an uncertificated security or in an im-
mobilized security. In that situation we could find that neither the
customer nor the lender would be in physical possession of the security.
Where securities are held in street name, rights against or to such securi-
ties would be asserted against the rights of a securities industry profes-
sional rather than against the security itself, i.e. there is as an indirect
holding of the securities. Additionally, brokers enter into short term col-
lateralized credit arrangements by giving as collateral, securities held in
their account with a securities depository, or kept by them in-house in
street name registration. These types of Held In Custody, or Agreement
to Pledge (ATP), security transactions are regular features of daily trad-
ing.47 The present version of Article 8 provides for the perfection of se-
curity interests in such ATP pledges,48 which raises the question of
conflict in situations in which the broker may have improperly used cus-
tomer assets to raise funds by this method.49 The situation often arises
where a priority assertion is made by an upstream lender who advances
funds while in possession (or control) of the securities.5°
The underlying premise, that the federally funded SIPC would pro-
tect the individual investor, is an abrogation of the principle that the law
should be responsible for those that deal with members of the industry.
When it is realized that this protection, at present, only extends to
42. Id. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988).
43. See id. § 78eee.
44. Id. § 78ddd(f).
45. Id. §§ 78ddd(g), (h).
46. See U.C.C. §§ 9-305, 9-312(5).
47. See id. § 8-321(2).
48. See id.
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1992) (indicating how customers' fully-paid securities are
to be safeguarded from claims of creditors of brokerage house).
50. See EGON GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFER 5-1 to -80, 55-1 to -51 (3d ed.
1987 & Supp. 1992).
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$500,000,"' it is apparent that the amount of federal protection offered is
insufficient to cover the needs of a retiree from a profession.
If, in the interest of efficiency, the immobilization of the investment
security is called for, then a protective step must be taken in the interest
of the supplier of the lifeblood of the industry. Presently the proposed
provision in the NCCUSL draft of section 8-513(a) gives the customer
some protection, provided the customer has not assented to the broker
using the securities to raise funds. But where such funds are needed to
support a customer's margin account, a conffict may arise between the
customer and a lender. The secured party will have priority if the se-
cured party takes control of the securities-for example, by having the
securities transferred to it. This would be the effect even though such
transfer may be a violation of federal rules demanding the segregation of
securities held for a customer who has fully paid any obligations owed
the broker.5 2
Efficiency rears its head in other areas of the UCC. As a result, the
law does not lead the technical developments, the technical developments
drive the law. This is a change from prior approaches to law and techno-
logical developments following the demands of industry. The revision of
section 4-406(a) is a good example of this change in approach to law
revision. After indicating that the statement of account made available
to the customer must allow the customer to reasonably identify items
paid by the bank, the section provides a safe harbor.5 3 Section 4-406(a)
states: "The statement of account provides sufficient information if the
item is described by item number, amount and date of payment."
'5 4
These informational details can be determined from the Magnetic Ink
Character Recognition Symbols. They do not, however, help to identify
the person to whom payment was made or who may have endorsed, or
may have failed to endorse, the instrument. Linked to this approach are
revisions encouraging truncation, including total truncation which would
allow the depositor to make electronic presentment55 and even electronic
deposits. A drawer may not discover that payment was made to a wrong
party until a considerable amount of time has passed, at which time it
may no longer be possible to remedy the situation, or when to do so
would be costly and time consuming. The reason for this approach in
the revision of section 4-406 is explained on the basis that
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a).
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(d).
53. U.C.C. § 4-406(a).
54. Id.
55. Id. §§4-110.
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[t]his policy results in less cost to the check collection system
and thus to all customers of the system. It is expected that
technological advances such as image processing may make it
possible for banks to give customers more information in the
future in a manner that is fully compatible with automation or
truncation systems. 6
This short outline of developments in the revisions of the UCC leads
to the conclusion that, from the point of view of a consumer advocate,
the UCC was "dead on arrival," or at best in extremis. Even those that
can be classified as commercial sophisticates, being members of the in-
dustry, find that the UCC has lost touch with the realities of the market-
place. There is a need to review and revive this patient. So far, however,
this merely meant that "le roi est mort, vive le roi." It is, in the immortal
words of Yogi Berra, "dejat vu all over again."
Proposals for revising the UCC are increasingly formulated in ac-
cordance with the interests of industry, without regard to the non-indus-
try participants who make industry possible. From a consumer
advocate's point of view, the UCC never provided a real base for con-
sumer protection. The UCC appears biased against both the retail con-
sumer and the nonmerchant industrialist engaged in transactions
involving one of the sophisticates in this area. Unfortunately, both of
these parties start in a deprived position. The UCC has survived only
because of the common-law courts' approaches in applying their genius
of reaching a fair result to the interpretation of a common-law statute,
rather than adopting a civil-law approach to the interpretation of the
UCC. However, there is little solace in the expectation that the courts
may interpret a provision of the UCC so as to provide a level playing
field. One cannot expect courts to expand provisions such as section 2-
302 because the industry insider has taken an unconscionable advantage.
There has been no real attempt to protect the ordinary consumer by pro-
viding the type of law that makes the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act so
attractive: law that tells states that they cannot go below this minimum
of market morality. As a result, the present revisions still leave the "em-
peror without clothes."
What can we recommend? The UCC is clearly not meeting the de-
mands of all parties involved in a commercial transaction. All the pres-
ent revisions show is plus qa change, plus cist la mime chose.57 When
applied to a "nonmercantile" relationship-one not between industrial
56. Id. § 4-406 cmt. 1.
57. The more things change, the more they remain the same.
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insiders-we must rely on the court to apply its provisions by analogy.
We have but one alternative, and that is to press for the adoption of
specific "user" oriented laws that will consider the need for efficiency but
will not sacrifice the protection of the user at the altar of market effi-
ciency. This would be dousing the fuel that drives the market.
